One Last Point...

When you see later authorities explaining a troubling earlier source in a way at first that seems to be a stretch, realize that this is not apologetics covering up for embarrassing earlier statements by our religious leaders, but attempts to reconcile single, minority sources with the mainstream Torah literature on a subject.  For example, regarding the Meiri's opinion cited below, there are countless sources in Tanach and Torah sheb'al peh that teach that all people are created בצלם אלוקים and upholding the dignity and value of all human life.  So when we see the Gemara seemingly ruling against that principle, it becomes the job of the commentaries to interpret the passage is a way that is coherent with its whole.

שבת, the Value of Life, and Troubling Texts

The issue of violating שבת to save the life of a non-Jew is not new to Why-aanot.  It has been a favorite tidbit of anti-Semites for generations, and has kept many Rabbis busy explaining the rationale by which it is permitted, encouraged and required.  In fact, just a few years ago it was all over the news, when Noah Feldman, a lawyer, diplomat and sometimes journalist published "Orthodox Paradox" in the New York Times Magazine.  While much of the substance of the essay - which detailed him being ostracized by the Modern Orthodox world in which he grew up following his intermarriage - turned out to be fabricated, he took the occasion to air what he considered to be some dirty laundry of his former community.  Included in his attacks, was a bizarre anecdote from his high school years in which a tragically misguided (or worse) Rabbi erroneously claimed that fundamentally, the rule is to allow the non-Jew to die, and that one who saves him for universal or altruistic reasons about the value of his life, is considered to have been מחלל שבת.  Whether the story is true or not, the rule is nonsense, with no basis in any Torah sources.  Once that Gemara hit the open press, a major uproar ensued, with responses from many diverse sources.

Previous posters have addressed most of the significant approaches to making sense of the Gemara.  Ms. Schwartz (in her last point) mentioned the position of the Meiri, which was restated at that time by Rabbi Shmuely Boteach in the Jerusalem Post.

Rabbi Lamm published a response that basically argued that what mattered was the end result, not the legalistic minutiae that led to that result.  This piece of his response was very controversial.  (

He also called Feldman out for publicizing the controversial Gemara so publicly.  He quoted a letter he recieved:
"You apparently were equally unaware of the damage your words have caused to innocent bystanders. Example: Daniel _____, a recent graduate of Yeshiva University, wrote this letter to me that broke my heart:

Like most Yeshiva University graduates, I interact on a daily basis with gentiles for most of my day. My Orthodox Jewish identity has never become an issue or conflict. However, following last week’s New York Times article by Noah Feldman… I have frequently been getting questions like, ‘Is it true that according to your law you wouldn’t save my life on the Sabbath’ or, ‘Do you really believe that Jewish life is more important than gentile life?’ How does a young Modern Orthodox professional answer these questions in a respectful and diplomatic way so as not to demonize others and at the same time be true to his faith?

My dear Noah Feldman, it is your duty to answer him, because you are the cause of his discomfiture and perhaps his possible inability to find employment."

This argument was attacked here. I am ambivalent, and hear both sides of the argument, though I wonder what expectations of responsibility we can reasonably expect from someone as obviously bitter and alienated as Feldman.

Another approach, mentions by Ms. Schwartz, and highlighted by Rabbi Prince is expanded upon by Rabbi Sholom Carmy.  Here is a passage:

In settling his scores with his alma mater, Feldman ascribes to his high school rebbi the claim that a doctor who treats a Gentile on Shabbat violates the day unless his explicit intention is to do so only in order to avoid animus. Though this sounds like nonsense, I am informed that a high school teacher actually said it.
The insinuation that religious Jewish doctors cannot be entrusted with the care of non-Jewish patients was, as we all know, part of the arsenal of 19th century European anti-Semitism. It was not meant in earnest: as an Orthodox deputy once remarked, during a debate on the licensing of physicians in the Austrian Parliament, several of the most outspoken leaders of the anti-Semitic party used Jewish doctors.
An honest understanding of the Halakha about saving a Gentile on Shabbat is grounded in the fact that not all mitsvot can be violated to save life. Idolatry, sexual offenses and murder may not be allowed even to save life, however this flies in the face of our utilitarian mentality. Shabbat has much in common with the so-called “big three.” [Note R. Shimon’s view in Yerushalmi that a bystander may intervene to prevent Shabbat violation even at the cost of the transgressor’s life.] For Jews Shabbat may be violated to save life, but only on the basis of a special limmud (inference)—“desecrate one Shabbat so that he may observe many Shabbatot.” Where this principle does not apply, Shabbat is inviolable.
Where people understand that religion may on occasion make life and death demands, the law that Shabbat is so important that it is overridden only for those who are members of the community that observes it is difficult but not scandalous. In our culture this understanding is lacking; thus the failure to treat Jews and Gentiles identically will be interpreted as indifference to the fate of the non-Jew, and will be perceived as tantamount to connivance in his death. It will provoke hatred, and understandably so. In this case, the theoretical gulf separating secularists from halakhists is not universalism vs. particularism but the recognition that Shabbat is, in principle, worth the sacrifice. It is common to stress that Judaism, compared, let us say, with Hinduism, affirms the value of human life and eschews such sacrifices. That the value of human life is overridden only in exceptional circumstances is a significant element in generalizing about Jewish ethics. But an almost absolute principle is not the same as an absolute one.

After all of these authorities, there is little to add, except to reiterate something that I have discussed with most of you before.   Anyone who learns Torah on a serious basis will occasionally encounter texts and sources that make her uncomfortable - be it on the subject of slavery, women, non-Jews, homosexuality etc.  Sometimes this is a result of the influence of Western culture, which we would not expect to be identical to the Torah world-view.  More often, we misinterpret the sources, and if we're lucky, are eventually corrected.  Most common though, we don't know which of these is true, and are left with a difficult, sometimes even painful clash between what we read in the Torah and what feels right to us.

I heard from my Rebbe an idea from the חובות הלבבות on this subject.  He noted that our conscious was also created by Hashem, and therefore it too is a valid means of determining His will.  However, just as if we were to (in theory, of course) have a contradiction between תורה שבכתב and תורה שבעל פה, we would follow the written תורה, because it is a more direct pipeline of the 'רצון ד, with less risk of the message being corrupted, our conscious is subject to influence from all kinds of places that could corrupt God's original message, so it is overruled when it conflicts with the תורה.

In the end, when confronted with these kinds of sources, I think we can safely discuss them on a forum like this, air our struggles, exchange ideas etc.  But most important is that the conversation take place within a context of intellectual humility.  The fact that I don't understand something now, doesn't mean I won't next week or next year or 10 years from now.  Maybe my daughter or great-grandson will figure it out, or maybe he won't.  To draw broad and definitive conclusions implies breadth of knowledge and depth of insight that most of us would be hard pressed to claim.  Patience, and a certain willingness to at least temporarily subordinate our own thought process to the broader Divine command is a core element of emuna (נעשה ונשמע), and one that we would do well to keep in mind (though again, one need not be a מאמין to try to avoid the pitfalls of intellectual hubris). 

No, I haven't graded your tests yet.

Saving a Non-Jew's Life on Shabbat (a matter of perspective)

Just to add a word to Ms. Schwartz’s comments, specifically one of the last points she makes:

“Violating shabbos for any reason-even saving a Jewish life, is not simple. The gemara in Yoma 85a[-b], brings 7 different pessukim in attempts to find the source for pikuach nefesh on shabbos. Though the gemara concludes with "Ve'chay bahem"-ve'lo she'yamut bahem, as the ultimate source, the fact that all 7 are quoted may imply that we need the weight of all 7 to justify violating shabbos at all. The Gr"a says that there is no greater sin then violating shabbos”.

I think this point is a particularly important one because it frames the discussion in a whole different light. Because of the naturally unpleasant reaction this Halacha engenders both by us Torah observant Jews (as discussed by Mrs. Appel), as well as those less familiar with Torah law, the question is usually asked and answered with the focus being on why and how the Torah could even entertain the possibility that a non-Jew be allowed to die simply because a Jew refuses to do melacha on Shabbat. I think perhaps that we should look at the issue differently. It is not that we love the non-Jew any less, but that we love the Shabbat more than almost anything else- to the extent that the Gemara (at least in its most basic understanding) needs to find a source which would allow us to violate Shabbat under any circumstances even to save the life of a Jew. Chazal were aware that pikuach nefesh doche Shabbat applies under all circumstances and yet they struggled to find a suitable source for why. Once we are no longer dealing with a Jew though, and our arguments and our sources which allow for the desecration of Shabbat disappear, we must then ask the question again this time relying on new sources and other rationale.

Fallout From the Snow

For many of us, last week's snowstorm served as a reminder of the rule against Hotza'a - carrying in public on שבת, as the eruv was down in many Jewish communities for the first time in recent memory.  This phenomenon was addressed in today's NY Times.  Often when the details of our observance are broadcast to the general public (an issue somewhat related to the other topic at hand here, which I hope to address soon), the results can be less than ideal, if not even embarrassing, but I think we did OK here.

Saving a Non-Jew's Life on Shabbat (an additional perspective)

I’d like to add a few thoughts regarding Talia’s question about saving a non-Jew’s life on Shabbat. This is the type of question that I find very difficult to consider within the abstract parameters of hypothetical situations, and so while I leave it to the halakhic experts at Ma’ayanot to deliver the kind of multi-faceted explanations that Ms. Schwartz has offered us, I would like to supplement them:

I think that when we consider pikuah nefesh from an abstract perspective, we risk losing a certain degree of our own status as tzelem Elokim by ignoring the notion that this feature characterizes all people. I don’t think we have to look outside our own tradition – originating in Tanakh itself – to suggest that it is abhorrent to entertain the possibility of having the opportunity to save a human life and opting not to do so because of an ungrounded assumption about the lesser value of a non-Jew’s life. Moreover, the idea that any one of us, faced with such a situation, would first stop to think about the halakhic ramifications of violating Shabbat relative to whether a person is Jewish or not (while perhaps losing precious time as a person is dying) makes my stomach turn. And so, with all the respect I have for due process in halakha, and for attempts to ground hashkafic perspectives in the basis of halakha, I would hope that our students recognize that if we aspire to emulate G-d Himself, then in this type of scenario, determining the value of a human life based on whether or not a person is Jewish requires a good deal of hubris that is not warranted in any one of us.

Saving the life of a non-Jew on Shabbos

Talia Friedman asked: Could you violate shabbos to save a non-Jew's life?

The reason I love this question is because there are so many halachic and hashkafic elements subsumed within it. Rather than address each of these issues completely (which would take the four huge booklets worth of mekorot sheets that I have from shiurim given by Rabbi Dr. Howard Apfel) I will at least try to highlight what some of the issues are:

1. The gemara in Avodah Zara, 26a discusses whether a Jewish midwife may deliver a non-Jewish baby on shabbos. Though me'ikar ha'din (the strict letter of the law), doing so is assur, the emoraim discuss possible heterim (allowances) including the concept of 'aiva'-literally 'hatred.' According to the concept of aiva, not delivering the non-Jewish baby, and by extension, not saving the non-Jew's life on shabbos, would incite hostility toward that Jewish midwife in particular, and to the Jewish nation in general.

2. Tosfot on this gemara brings up the issue of de'oraita vs. de'rabanan. Do we allow violation of all shabbos halachot due to the fear of aiva? Or may only de'rabanans on shabbos be violated? Most rishonim, including the Ramban, Sefer ha'trumot, and the Ritvah hold that only de'rabanans may be violated mishum aiva (because of hatred). Rav Ovadia Yosef says that saving a non-Jewish life on shabbos falls under the category of melacha she'aina tzricha le'gufa, because I am not doing the melachot for their specific function but simply in order to not be fired/ to not garner anti-semitism. Therefore all violations done to save a non-Jewish life become melachot she'ainan tzrichot le'gufan, and all become de'rabanans. This solves the de'oraita/de'rabanan dilemna.

According to the Chatam Sofer, the doctor may violate de'oraitas because not doing so would mean risking his own life (due to possible anti-semitism that may result). The Tzitz Eliezer expands this to say that the whole of am yisrael may be put in danger by one Jew's refusal to treat a non-Jew on shabbos. (Think about what would happen if all the non-Jewish doctors in the world decided to stop treating Jews).

3. Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach addresses the question-what if Aiva is not an issue, because you're on a deserted island and no one will ever find out whether you could have saved this non-Jew's life but didn't. He says Aiva still would exist as a Matir (allowance) in this instance, because you never know when word can get out.

4. Hashkafic issues: How do we deal with the fact that me'ikar hadin-it is assur to save a non-Jew's life on shabbos?

a)One important point to make is that we have an ideal in Judaim that the command of Gd must come before any of our own ethical conceptions. As Rav Soloveitchik says (in a shiur made at the RCA convention in 1975)-this is a crucial component of accepting "ol malchut shamayim"-the burden of heaven. Noteworthy is the fact that Rav Soloveitchik is quoted by Rav Yaakov Blidstein as saying, "'...I have always ruled that one saves the lives of Gentiles, because if we don't permit this, they won't treat our sick ones.' I asked him if this reason satisfied him from an ethical standpoint, and he replied, 'No, from an ethical standpoint it does not satisfy me.'" Obviously, the conflict between our own sense of morality and our subservience to the Ratzon Hashem is not a simple one to resolve.

b) Another important point to make is that violating shabbos for any reason-even saving a Jewish life, is not simple. The gemara in yoma 85a brings 7 different pssukim in attempts to find the source for pikuach nefesh on shabbos. Though the gemara concludes with "Ve'chay bahem"-ve'lo she'yamut bahem, as the ultimate source, the fact that all 7 are quoted may imply that we need the weight of all 7 to justify violating shabbos at all. The Gr"a says that there is no greater sin then violating shabbos.

c) We may be able reread the gemara in Avoda Zara by reinterpreting the type of non-Jew who falls within the scope of the gemara. The gemara talks about "Ovdei Kochavim." In a famous statement by the Meiri on Avoda Zara perek 2, he says that people of other monotheistic religions who subscribe to principles of morality do not fall under the category of "ovdei kochavim" who are by definition "impure in their actions, and ugly in their Middot." Rav Kook in Iggrot Ha're'iya seems to agree with the position of the Meiri. In that case, the obligation to save a Jewish life on shabbos would be the same as that to save of the life of a morally upright non-Jew.

I really feel like I have not done this topic justice, so please ask any follow up questions you may have, and I or someone else can elaborate!

More on Moshe Rabbeinu & the Evolution of Torah

Talia responded to Mrs. Block's post:

First of all, did Rabbi Akiva come up with the story about himself? Was it a dream? Was it his own justification?

Also why would Moshe be appeased and placated if he sees that he is misquoted and misinterpretated. The Rabbanim, Zichronim Le'bracha, use Moshe's name, to reinterpret Moshe-yet Moshe is satisfied to realized that he is quoted and misunderstood. Conversely he should be even more frustrated.
This response reminds me of the "Nitzchunee Banai" story with "Torah lo Mishemayim Hee" but there must be a limit. And if Rabbi Akiva recognized that he was interpretating something that was not meant to be interpretated, why didn't he stop?

Also, why don't we take reinterpretating the Torah to the extreme, and have a whole new book-like the New Testament? If we recognize, as Menachot 29b seems to imply, that the Rabbanim knew they were writing something Moshe had not originally intended, than what is wrong with having an entirely New Testament?

In response, we have another guest post by Rabbi Kenneth Schiowitz, Rabbi of Congregation Shaare Tefillah of Teaneck: 

On the first question, I do not know, but in the Talmud, the story is not told by Rebbe Akiva himself, but by a later rabbi, Rav. If anyone had an agenda in making up the story, it was probably to explain the whole assumption and basis of the process of Torah Shebaal Pe. Rebbe Akiva was not the only one to ever introduce a new idea that may not have been known to Moshe.


I agree with Mrs. Block that this gemarah is very relevant to this issue. I would add by expanding on the significance of the end of that story, that Rebbe Akiva attributed his teaching to "halacha leMoshe miSinia". Rebbe Akiva's work represented the dynamic and evolving nature of Torah and halacha. Nevertheless, they are all rooted in the tradition from Sinai, and evolved through the application of the principles that God taught Moshe. There is a limit, and there is a reason why we cannot make a whole new book. Because God taught Moshe rules and principles that he, and later Jews, will use in order to interpret the Torah. This is a dynamic process, but we are expected to be creative and innovative within the parameters that God told Moshe. Indeed, every novelty of Rebbe Akiva is based on the information and rules that were given to Moshe at Sinai. They do not represent misinterpretation but rather further development. Apparently, even Moshe did not anticipate all the wisdom that would be built upon the information that he transmitted to God and to the Jewish people, but ultimately felt nachat when seeing it.


It is as if a great 18th century scientist would be shown a vision of the first spaceship to travel to the moon in the 1960's. This is a possibility that was probably a wild dream in the 1700's. Imagine if he would discover in that vision that the ability for this to take place was all based on his discoveries from the 18th century. That would not be called a misinterpretation, but the application, and the building upon his own ideas. That would be great nachat!


Rebbe Akiva did interpret things the way that they were supposed to be interpreted, but maybe not by Moshe, but only by God. Yes, there is a limit. Innovation is the essence of the Torah Shebaal Pe, but they must be developed within the limits of the rules that were told at Sinai and that have been developed over the generations.


Interestingly, the gemarah of "nitzchuni banai" that you have referred to opens up another issue - that perhaps God Himself has created a system where more than one interpretation can be offered, within the limits of the rules. And incredibly, God left if for use to choose the interpretation to be followed in the halacha (through the rule of majority), even if it is not what He had in mind. Apparently, it is more important to God that this would become a human process than it be most accurate. If He sought perfection in the halacha, then He probably would have written the whole thing Himself.

Divinity of the Torah

Talia Friedman asked: Why do we believe God wrote the Torah? I know the Torah says so, but if I wrote a book I may also claim that. Why do you believe the Torah's claim to divinity?

I want to start by saying that I personally think that we can never 100% prove things such as God’s existence or that He wrote the Torah; I believe that religion by definition requires at least some leap of faith. Still, we can (and I think should) come up with arguments that make these fundamental beliefs more believable/logical so that the leap is a little less daunting. Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen has written 2 books on these topics: Permission to Believe, which presents arguments for God’s existence, and Permission to Receive, which offers arguments on behalf of the Torah’s Divinity. You may want to read them.

One of the arguments that I personally find one of the more convincing ones on behalf of the Torah’s authenticity is one that I think I first read in Rabbi Kelemen’s book. It is as follows:
There are only 2 possible explanations of how we have the book known as the Bible/Torah: The first possibility is that it was Divinely given on Mount Sinai as it itself describes. If that is NOT how it was given to mankind, then that would necessarily mean that some person at some point in history fabricated it (meaning he made the whole thing up and wrote it himself), brought it to the public, and lied, claiming that he had unearthed this amazing book written by God that had somehow gotten lost up until his amazing discovery. At first glance, the second possibility sounds more logical and likely than the possibility that God Himself spoke to an entire nation in the middle of the desert. However, if that is what happened, then why is there no record whatsoever of who this person was who brought the most important book in the history of the world to light??? Why do we not know anything about who this person was or when he/she lived??? The total lack of any mention of any such person or any such thing happening strongly indicates that it did not in fact happen – that there never was a person who at some later point in history brought the Bible to mankind. The only person ever mentioned as the one who brought this book to mankind is Moses, who is described as having received it on Mount Sinai directly from God Himself.

One might try to argue that perhaps Moses himself made the whole thing up. However, this possibility is highly unlikely, because in contrast to virtually all other religions, the Torah makes the claim that God revealed Himself to the entire nation - men, women, and children - in order to give this book. Moses could not possibly have come to the Children of Israel and given them a book that explicitly says in it that every single one of them saw God Himself on Mount Sinai if none of them actually experienced any such thing. It would have been a ridiculously blatant lie; the people would have laughed him off. So if Moses could not have made it up, and there is no record whatsoever of any other person later in history introducing this all-important book to the world, then the only remaining possible explanation as to how we have this book in our hands is that we received it exactly as it itself tells us we did – through Moses who got it directly from God Himself after He revealed Himself to the entire nation.

Again, I am not claiming that what I wrote above is indisputable (I can think of at least one strong argument that could possibly be made against it – if you’re interested, you can ask me in school). As I said at the outset, I don’t think there can be any absolutely indisputable proof of God’s existence or His authorship of the Torah. But I personally feel that the above argument at least helps make something that otherwise sounds completely outlandish – that we have a book in our hands whose author is God – a little more believable.

Making Moshe Proud?

Hi! I'm Mrs. Block and I recently started helping out in Mrs. Knoll's gemara seminar class on Fridays. I look forward to meeting more Ma'ayanot students in the coming weeks!

Regarding Talia Friedman's question-- Do you think Moshe Rabbeynu would be ashamed at how Judaism is practiced today? Every time I read the Gemara and see how laws are derived I just think that Moshe Rabbeynu could not have intended the words to be interpreted the way they are.

There is a gemara in Menachot 29b that I think addresses this question head-on and describes how Moshe himself was concerned with this very issue until Hashem comforted him. The story goes as follows--When Moshe went up to shamayim, he saw Hashem tying crowns (ketarim--the lines over the letters in a sefer torah) onto letters. Moshe asked Hashem why He was doing that and what was missing from Hashem's word that He needed to add these lines? Hashem responded that there will be a person many generations later who would derive halachot from every line of every letter in the Torah. Moshe asked Hashem who and Hashem answered that his name is Akiva ben Yosef, referring to Rebbi Akiva. Hashem then sent Moshe to Rebbi Akiva's beit midrash to see what was going on there. When Moshe got there, he didn't understand a word they were saying and didn't recognize anything they were talking about. The gemara describes that Moshe was extremely depressed by this, until he heard one of the students ask Rebbi Akiva where he got a certain halacha from and Rebbi Akiva answered that it is a "halacha l'moshe m'sinai." After that, the gemara describes that Moshe was appeased and placated.

I think the point of this gemara is to show that Torah was meant to be alive and dynamic and meant to be interpreted (obviously, according to Hashem's rules of interpretation that He gave to us in torah she'baal peh) and analyzed and learned in every generation. All the interpretations and derivations of halachot are really all part of a mesorah (tradition) that started with Hashem giving the Torah to Moshe on Har Sinai.

If Rebbi Akiva were alive today, he probably wouldn't recognize many of the things that go on in our world--but that is just part of the beauty of Torah. We're all living the same Torah and applying it to the circumstances of our lives.

Those who forget history are זוכה to review it

See here regarding Michelle's question & Mrs. Shapiro's answer.

Details

Why is it important for us to know what cloth were hanging in the palace and all the other seemingly extra information at the beginning of the megilla?

This is a great question.  Everyone who does any public speaking knows that you need to have a big start (a "hook") and a big finish in order to get the audience interested, and leave them remembering that they enjoyed the speech.  I'm always struck by how the Megilah seems to take the opposite approach - heavy on detail early on, a rich and exciting plot that goes by quickly in the middle, and then after the story is seemingly over, more detail on the holiday, the battles, the messages, the taxes etc.  Did you ever notice how long it is from when Haman is killed to the end?

Specifically to your question though, on a midrashic level we know that the account is meant to allude to the keilim of the בית המקדש, either because Achashverosh stole the keilim, or imitated them, or because the first פרק (and perhaps the whole megilla, but that's for another day / year) is ALSO an allegory for the King (Hashem) throwing a party and inviting the queen (Bnei Yisrael, to come rebuild the בית המקדש), who refused to come, angering the King (Hashem) who decreed that she (we) should be removed.  It is noteworthy again, that we find no record of the decree for death being carried out, only publicized - this is the decree of Haman, setting up the rest of the sefer.

A Peshat Answer

To address another of Michelle's questions:
Didn't Achashverosh tell Esther, right before her request to hang Haman's sons, that Haman's sons were hung?

This question once bothered me also, and as a budding Tanakh teacher who didn't have a blog to write to, I thought of the following. (The mefarshim on the megillah that I saw don't really address it explicitly.) If you read the peshat carefully, though, you see that at the beginning of perek 9 it says that the 10 sons of Haman were killed in the battle in Shushan, and then Esther asked that they be hanged. The hanging was not a means of killing them, since they were already dead. Rather, this display was probably meant to instill fear in any potential enemies of the Jews. See Devarim 21:22-23 and the mefarshim there for a mention of the practice of hanging a dead body and the limits thereof.

knowthewords

At a post-seuda mesiba that I attended last night surrounding Maariv, an anonymous MTA senior impressed me with his repertoire of old school, traditional Jewish music.  When I asked him how he knew all of the good stuff, he told me about this blog.  That session, lead by a top-notch baal tefilla, and later joined on the piano by a professional musician who told stories of times when he used to play concerts behind R' Shlomo Carlebach reminded me of the power of music to stir us spiritually.  I wouldn't say it's a kiyum of Talmud Torah (like this blog usually is), but I think that any time spent on that site is well-spent.

Productively Unproductive

One question Michelle Zivari asks is: How is it that Haman's wife knew something Esther didn't know? Haman's wife knew that if Haman was putting himself against the Jews the Jews would prevail why didn't Esther have the same faith instead of hesitating before going to the king?

There are many questions we can ask about Esther's actions in the Megilla, perhaps the most significant one being her ambivalence and lack of forthrightness when pleading her case before Achashveirosh. Why doesn't she just tell him what she wants, especially after he offers her half his kingdom, instead of just inviting him and Haman to not one, but two parties?! I don’t think we should assume that she doubted in Hashem or thought for a minute that ultimately the Jews would not be saved, rather, she was dealing with an impetuous and wary man, who if you read the Megilla seems to act more on impulse than anything else. Sometimes the fact that we already know the outcome of the Megilla causes us to lose sight of the fact that Esther's hishtadlut and the approach she and Mordechai chose to take in dealing with their situation was by working through political and diplomatic channels; unfortunately, this meant that they needed to have a lot of "faith" that Achashveirosh would remain levelheaded enough to act in the Jews' interest.

Someone was paying attention during the Megilla

A bunch of questions on the Purim story from Michelle Zivari:

1. Why is it important for us to know what cloth were hanging in the palace and all the other seemingly extra information at the beginning of the megilla?

2.How is it that Haman's wife knew something Esther didn't know? Haman's wife knew that if Haman was putting himself against the Jews the Jews would prevail  why didn't Esther have the same faith instead of hesitating before going to the king?

3. When Haman was coming home after he was invited to the party he told his wife that he saw Mordechai HAYEHUDI, he told her the he was Jewish why know does she say build him a gallow instead of telling him like she does later that he can't win?

4. Why after Achashverosh kills somebody does it have to say afterwards and then his anger subsided?

5. Didn't Achashverosh  tell Esther, right before her request to hang Haman's sons, that Haman's sons were hung?

6.Why are sons punished and why are they highlighted specifically?

~HAPPY PURIM

All answers, or other questions, are welcome from students & faculty alike are very welcome.  I have some thoughts, and hope to share them soon.

בימים ההם, בזמן הזה - More on Vashti

Another Purim miracle!  I had a surprise in my inbox this morning, from my חברותא, entitled "A freilichin purim! Ein simcha elah torah":

I was learning the megila agadeta over shabbos and I was telling [my wife] about one of the gemaras and what the sfas emes said on the gemara and when I told her - she said - that answers [Rabbi Besser's] question!

The gemara darshens the pasuk that Hashem will wipe out from Bavel all remenant and survivor, including nin va-neched. The gemara explains that "neched" refers to vashti. The sfas emes explains that the whole purim story was a hachanah for the rebuilding of the beis hamikdash (which makes sense given that the gemara in sanhedrin says that you machris zaro shl amaleik before binyan beis hamikdash - and therefore purim was the precursor to rebuilding the beis hamikdash, there's more to say but acm"l). The sfas emes continues that therefore vashti was killed to destroy the house of nevuchadnezar that destroyed the first mikdash, in preparation for building the second. At which point [she] said -that's why chazal care that vashti was killed, to finish of nevuchadnezar as part the preparation for bayis sheini.

Hope all else is well and have a great day!

War-Mongering Yehudim?

This article, while factually correct, is in my mind irresponsible for failing to note that Amalek has come to symbolize the embodiment of evil more than the obligation to wipe them out and I would guess that is the context for most of the references he mentions so ominously.

מלחמת הצבעים

At the risk of being מערב שמחה בשמחה, there is also great excitement in the air about the color war that was broken out on Thursday (if you didn't hear yet it was).  It's very appropriate that we have color war during the most colorful פרשיות in the Torah - the end of תרומה & תצוה, and heading into כי תשא (red, gold, copper), and the ויקהל & פקודי.  I once saw (I can't remember where) a nice explanation about why the main cloth colors were red, blue & purple.  He pointed out that red represents humanity, and blue symbolizes Hashem.  The purple is the combination of the two - the areas where we meet.  There is much rich Torah content to our next few days, highlighted of course by our 5th annual Chazara Bowl.  Have a wonderful Purim, but then, be in touch with your team leaders & see what you can do to start getting ready tomorrow.

Purim Sameach!!!

Welcome back.  We've taken almost a week off so as not to compete for you attention with the other school blog - Whyaa-NOT, in the Swamp, the Purim issue of the Source.  Now that you've had a long weekend to read it, we're back full time, and with progress reports to be written, I'm confident that we'll have teachers looking for productive ways to be unproductive.

As I started talking about with some of you, I'm fascinated in the discrepancies, more big picture than factual, between the megilla itself and the Torah sheb'aal  peh that goes along with it (Masechet Megilla and the Midrash, primarily).  We've discussed at length in the past the difference in the role of obvious ניסים in the story, with 'יד ד hidden in the מגילה but quite prominent in the same story in תורה שבעל פה.

One question interests me some this year, is the fate of Vashti.  While the מדרש makes it clear that she is executed by Achashverosh, the simple peshat seems just as evident that she was simply banished.  Remember, even though it says that the next morning he regretted what he had done, Achashverosh could not bring her back, because his decree could not be undone - see the end of the Megilla.  More than the question as to what happened historically, I wonder why it was important to Chazal that she had been killed (unless the answer is, because that's what actually happened).

You know where to send your thoughts, I'm looking forward to discussing it.  Have a happy (& SAFE!) Purim.

Purim is Coming, We're so Happy

While we shared much Torah on Purim (not Purim Torah) at mishmar on Thursday, and you have the opportunity to hear shiurim during lunch by Mrs. Nadler & Mrs. Kraft the next two days during lunch in the MPR, here is some more Torah for those of you who prefer your Torah on-line:

• While I haven't yet read it, YU's Purim to Go promises to continue it's tradition of outstanding pre-Yom Tov Torah.  As usual, it opens with a vintage drasha by Rabbi Lamm, and is highlighted (keeping it in the family) by an essay by our own Rabbi Sinensky.  There is also an article that seems to be about slavery, which off of the recent conversation here has me intrigued.
• Additionally, the YU Website has, literally hundreds of shiurim on purim - audio and articles- including what they call "the funny stuff" on the bottom.
• Finally, most of the sites listed on the side have entries for Purim as well, make good use of them.

Great Question on Parashat Terumah

Hennie Silverman asks the following question-aren't the keruvim avoda zarah? We aren' t supposed to make idols or figures and the keruvim are gold figures with faces so how is that allowed?

Your question is so good that it bothered gedolim of the past. It is addressed by two great Spanish rishonim who lived 350 years apart, R. Yehudah ha-Levi (1075-1141; author of Sefer ha-Kuzari), and R. Yitzchak Abarbanel (1437-1508).

In an important passage in which he addresses the sin of the Golden Calf (Kuzari I:97), R. Yehudah ha-Levi gives the mashal of a foolish person who goes into a pharmacy and mixes up some medications to take. In a pharmacist’s hands, those medicines heal, but in the hands of someone who doesn’t know what he’s doing, they are poisons. Similarly, Hashem has told us not to make idols or worship images even if we are doing it to worship Him, and if we make images on our own (such as the Golden Calf) then it is spiritual poison. But if He commands us to worship Him by building keruvim, then the keruvim are spiritual medicine.

Abarbanel asks your question almost exactly the same way you did in his commentary to Parashat Terumah (page 239, second question) – how do the keruvim not violate the Second Commandment? He explains at length that each aspect of the mishkan was constructed as a symbol of a moral/spiritual idea. On page 252 he writes specifically about the keruvim. The keruvim, which looked like a boy and a girl, are meant to remind Bnei Yisrael that every man and woman should, from his or her childhood, constantly think about Hashem and Torah. Since they were built not for worship at all, but to serve as a symbolic reminder of Bnei Yisrael’s ideal behavior, they are not avodah zarah.

Avodah Sheb'lev

The next submission for Avodah Sheb'lev is due soon (March 2) on any passage that we say before Mizmor Shir (the beginning of Tefillah for the beginning of the semester).  Here is the last winner:

From Tachanun: “Save us, Hashem our God, and gather us from among the peoples, to give thanks to your Holy Name and to glory in your praise”

By: Zisse Hanfling

It was the first time there was a split second of

Silence

You looked around

and the trucks engine cracked it

they swerved it.

Broke down the barbed wires

Smashed through what the Germans called a home

Soldiers jumped out

and infiltrated the grounds.

Peoples eyes weren’t even amazed

How could it be?

It was a dream I thought

I looked at all the gaunt, wan and pale faces around me

Just searching in there minds

Is this a miracle?

Or is this just a hallucination?

All the times I cried out to god

“where are you”

“why aren’t you here for your nation”

“were we left, and forgotten?”

Tears streaming down my boney face

Fallen on the dirt road that was stroked with blood

But my father’s lonely voice whispered in my head

Right before he was sentenced to his death

“Son, if you live to tell of the tale of the persecution of our

People remember to thank god for me. Tell him you will always follow

His commandments and praise his holy name, for me my son”

From then on I did it.

God might seem to have left us.

God sometimes seems to not love us.

And God can be fearful and mighty.

But HE loves us

But HE formed us

But HE created this world for us

And that alone should make us praise his Holy Name

More on Kulah Shopping

A while back, Rikki asked an intriguing question about "kulah shopping," and got a comprehensive response from the Sinenskys.  For further clarification of this difficult issue, we are lucky to have a guest respondent, another local Rabbi.  Here is a response from Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman, Rabbi of Etz Chaim of Teaneck:

In response to the question about what is wrong with “kulah shopping” I think that the problem is one if intellectual integrity.  The act of psak is a quest for truth - you should act in accordance with the opinion that you think is right; however, the problem is that people often don’t know enough to determine what is right, so like with everything else in life, they need to ask an expert.  Then the question becomes how you decide who to ask.  It would make sense that the questioner should ask the posek she believes is most likely to give an answer she believes is the most accurate possible “truth” (and who is available).

Sometimes, it is already known that there are a range of opinions.  Selecting among them also requires intellectual honesty.  It would seem that there are, in general, three good reasons to choose a specific rabbinic view to follow:

   1. It represents the majority of poskim.

   2. You consider the posek to be the foremost authority on the subject;

   3. You have a specific personal relationship with him (or the opinion itself seems correct, and you are expert enough to know);

Any of these can be valid, depending on the circumstances, and don’t necessarily require that you ask all of your questions to the same person.  If you consider one person to be the expert on business issues, and another on rules of שבת, that is fine.  Or someone could ask her everyday שאילות to a Rabbi that is easy to reach, and save “big ticket” issues for someone who she considers greater or with whom she feels more closely connected, but might be harder to contact regularly.

That said, choosing a Rabbi or psak based on the results can suffer from a lack of intellectual honesty.  If we are striving for what is right, we must be careful not to allow our biases about what we want to be the answer to be.  Think of it like choosing a doctor for advice on how to treat a serious medical condition.  I might go to the doctor who is at the top of her field in the particular area that I need help, or I might go to the one who has been treating me for years, or the one who is a close family friend, but I would never choose based on which one is going to tell me that I don’t need surgery or that I can continue to live on hot dogs and diet soda.  When we realize that the stakes in terms of Halacha observance are high, and that the notion of eilu v’eilu does not imply a halachik free-for-all, the problems with kulah shopping are clear.

This comes up regularly for Rabbis themselves.  Often their congregants ask “why can’t we do ________ (halachikally controversial practice), ______________ (Orthodox Rabbi) says that it’s OK?”  The answer is that the fact that a single or even multiple Rabbis endorse something, unless the Rabbi who needs to decide has a specific reason - see the three listed above – to take this position, he won’t, and shouldn’t be expected to.

 

Calvin and Hobbes, Snow Days and Tefilah

As many of you know, I am a big fan of "Calvin and Hobbes" cartoons and I think many of them have a lot of great messages. One of the classic themes running through the cartoons is Calvin's endless debates and schemes to try and get it to snow, hopefully resulting in a snow day where he can then go sledding off cliffs with Hobbes or build crazy and twisted looking snowmen.

Anyways, looking at these cartoons and the way Calvin tries different tricks to push either "G-d" or "the forces of nature" to get it to snow reminded me a lot of some of the traps we can fall into in how we view Tefilah, or in biblical times, how Jews viewed korbanot. As many of you may have learned in Tanakh class, there are many statements in Nevi'im that seem to be very anti-korbanot. Yeshayahu (1:11) tells the people how G-d doesn't want our offerings and has had enough of them:

לָמָּה-לִּי רֹב-זִבְחֵיכֶם יֹאמַר יְהוָה שָׂבַעְתִּי עֹלוֹת אֵילִים וְחֵלֶב מְרִיאִים וְדַם פָּרִים וּכְבָשִׂים וְעַתּוּדִים לֹא חָפָצְתִּי .

Yirmiyahu addresses this issue as well, telling the people (7:21-23) that they should just eat the korbanot themselves, since G-d definitely does not want them, He just wants them to keep His Mitzvot:

כא כֹּה אָמַר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עֹלוֹתֵיכֶם סְפווּ עַל-זִבְחֵיכֶם וְאִכְלווּ בָשָׂר. כב כִּי לֹא-דִבַּרְתִּי אֶת-אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם וְלֹא צִוִּיתִים בְּיוֹם הוציא (הוֹצִיאִי) אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם עַל-דִּבְרֵי עוֹלָה וָזָבַח. כג כִּי אִם-אֶת-הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה צִוִּיתִי אוֹתָם לֵאמֹר שִׁמְעוּ בְקוֹלִי וְהָיִיתִי לָכֶם לֵאלֹהִים וְאַתֶּם תִּהְיוּ-לִי לְעָם וַהֲלַכְתֶּם בְּכָל-הַדֶּרֶךְ אֲשֶׁר אֲצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם לְמַעַן יִיטַב לָכֶם

The Nevi'im are not coming out against korbanot specifically, but against the dangerous attitude that can develop while bringing korbanot (and while davening as well). People start to believe that as long as they are bringing korbanot and doing all the "rituals" that they are required to do, that they are then absolved of all other responsibility when it comes to ethical and moral behavior outside of the Temple. As long as you are bringing korbanot, you have now "payed off G-d" and no longer have to worry about anything else. Plus, G-d now "owes" you and must answer your Tefilot!

This can happen with Tefilah as well. One can start to view the Tefilah relationship as one where we "control" G-d. By pushing the right buttons and saying the right prayers at the right times, we start to think that we can get G-d to give us whatever we want. This trap that we can sometimes fall into is the same erroneous attitude of the Jews living at the time of the Nevi'im and lehavdil, of Calvin and his offerings to the snow gods.

In reality, Tefilah and korbanot are trying to establish a very different type of dynamic and relationship between us and G-d. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks explains in his introduction to the Koren Siddur how the very essence of korbanot is about "sacrifice"; it is an "act of renunciation", where by giving something away we acknowledge how everything we have comes from G-d and reiterate our need for Him - not the other way around. Prayer is supposed to be a "transformative experience" where the external actions that we do bring us to an internal awareness of our utter dependency on G-d, whether or not He answers our prayers.

Some thoughts to keep in mind next time we daven for a snow day!

Greetings From Israel

From alum and Torah Committee friend, Atara Staiman:

just wanted to send some hello wishes from sha'alvim for women...

i sit today at the computer on our chessed day and i'm a little under the weather and it's pouring cats and dogs outside (baruch hashem...)

i came onto the computer and knew i needed something fufilling to read and i had been meaning to check the blog but it's blocked on our main computers upstairs! (which will be put to an end soon!)

i sat here for like a half an hour reading all the details on the blog- it was so thought provoking!

i loved how i really knew alot when it came to the halachot.... i have the best 39 melachot class ever so i knew about the high heels and the borer questions...

it was fun to read about girl-boy friendships because obviously while being israel you think about other perpectives on relationships with boys in high school.... opposed to the one many of my friends and i took.

everyone's passion on the blog is amazing! it was so much fun to feel part of it again!

just wanted to send over hello wishes and that you have readers all the way in eretz yisrael!

hope all is welll- i miss everyone!!!!

Tashlumin for the Policy on Makeups

An anonymous freshman asks:

during vacation, like this coming presidents weekend, most of us wake up late, and sometimes it is too late to daven shacharis at the right time. i know that if you miss shacharis by accident, you have to daven 2 shmoneh esrehs during mincha. however, i was wondering what the exact rules are. for example, do you daven ashrei and then say two consecutive shmoneh esrehs? do you say aleinu in between them? also, is waking up too late by accident, or should you daven at noon if that is when you wake up? is this also considered "by accident" if technically it could be avoided? thanks in advance for the response!!

And she didn't even know how much of a vacation it would be!  Thankfully we just discussed this last month.  See here.

כל המלמד את בן חבירו תורה כאילו יולדו

Reading Rabbi Prince's excellent summary of the laws of pizza, I noticed the anecdote about his son, and thought, "you're lucky, many kids would come home and say YOU'RE doing something wrong - Morah told me.  Kids are presented with two different religious authority figures on a daily basis - their parents and teachers.  When the two conflict, it gets complicated, and confusing for the student.  I noticed that there is an article about this in the new Hakirah journal, by noted psychologist Dr. Aharon Hersh Fried entitled The Respect We Owe Each Other—For the Sake of Our Children.  Unfortunately, they only make the first two pages of articles in the current volume available on line, and in this case, it is a reprint of a somewhat angry letter from a parent, but as someone who has been on both sides of the issue, I look forward to reading it soon.

Ideally, there should be a third significant religious influence on young Jews, the shul Rabbi, but I find that with some important exceptions, it is difficult to foster that relationship.  I have always made a consultation with their shul Rabbi a mandatory piece of my students' halacha project, and have been thanked by local Rabbanim who appreciate the opportunity to interact with their young members.  As I mentioned, I hope that we will soon use this blog as another way to try to give you a comfortable opportunity to talk about real, issues that you think about with the Rabbanim in your community.

The Correct Beracha on Pizza

Jordana Wietschner asks: What's the deal with washing or not washing for pizza?


I am assuming that your question is not just about whether or not you must wash your hands before eating pizza, but rather, which beracha to make before eating it, hamotzi or mezonot? This is a good question, which as I am sure you can imagine does not have a simple answer, otherwise, like bread or pretzels everyone would recite the same beracha, but of course they do not!

Just to illustrate the lack of unanimity over this food, I will share with you the following personal anecdote. My four-year old son recently learned about the beracha of mezonot in school. After every new beracha they learn the teacher has the children prepare a food for that new beracha. But unlike the other berachot, all the children know that mezonot is special, because when they learn about mezonot they will take a class trip to the pizza shop! After his trip to the pizza shop my son came home with lots to tell us, but he was also deeply disturbed. He told my wife and me that night, “The Morah didn’t do the right thing. She told us to make a mezonot on pizza but you are supposed to make a hamotzi (this is what we do in our home)”. And of course, they are both right…perhaps.

The halachot of berachot in general are far from straight forward, and are at times quite complex. As is the case with pizza, when it comes to figuring out the proper beracha, the devil is often in the details. We will therefore outline in brief some of the major factors which are taken into consideration in this particular case.

The reason there is so much discussion over what beracha to recite over pizza is because of the nature of the food itself. Pizza is considered by most to be in the in between category comprised of those things which are neither definitively hamotzi nor necessarily mezonot, this category of food is referred to as “pat haba b’kisnin”, lit. Bread which comes in the form of a pocket, (or, "filled dough"). Pat haba b’kisnin, which includes an array of baked goods, possesses many of the same qualities as bread, and yet is not regarded like bread completely, because they do not serve the same purpose as bread, but are normally eaten as a snack or dessert.

Before we can discuss what beracha one makes on pat haba b’kisnin and when we treat it like bread and when we do not, we first have to define the term bread or “hamotzi”, in general. Bread is by definition: Made of the five grains (barley, wheat, oat, spelt and rye), is something which most people will make a meal out of, and has “bread-like” qualities (as opposed to something like noodles or farina). When it comes to bread, one must make a hamotzi regardless of why they eat it or how much of it they eat.

Those foods which are similar to bread in appearance and consistency, but which do not normally constitute a meal and are deemed more like "snack foods" or dessert, are referred to as pat haba b’kisnin. The Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim,168 discusses in detail which foods are considered pat haba b’kisnin. There is not a clear consensus over what exactly is classified as pat haba b’kisnin. According to some Rishonim it is literally filled dough, like a pie or turnover. Others feel that it includes anything made with dough which was kneaded with juice, honey, milk, sugar, oil etc. if one can taste these ingredients in the dough, (as opposed to bread which is generally much simpler and less sweet). Still others feel that a food's consistency determines its classification, and thus dry, brittle or crumbly products are considered pat haba b’kisnin. The Shulchan Aruch concludes that a food with any of these characteristics is treated like pat haba b’kisnin.

The Gemara Berachot, 42a concludes that one makes a mezonot over any food which is considered like pat haba b’kisnin so long as he does not make a meal out of it. It is important therefore before reaching any conclusion on pizza to first determine if it meets the criteria of pat haba b’kisnin and how and when one is considered to be making a meal out of it, (or, being kove'a seuda).

The Shulchan Aruch rules that the standard one uses for how much is, or is not, considered a seuda is objective and is dependent on what most people consider to be the amount normally consumed over the course of a meal. However, this objective standard, of course, depends on which group of people we are talking about, as eating habits differ greatly between different groups of people and do not mean the same thing for the young and the old alike, (Biur Halacha). (Although the Biur Halacha makes no distinction between men and women, one might assume that he would agree that what constitutes a seuda for each of them varies because the quantity they generally consume during a meal differs).

At the very end of Siman 168 the Shulchan Aruch refers to an item called "pashtida" which is baked with either meat, fish or cheese. According to the Shulchan Aruch one recites a hamotzi over this dish, which is defined as dough which is folded over and stuffed with the items mentioned above (pizza, which is made of dough and cheese seems to fit this description). It is unclear though whether or not the Shulchan Aruch would require a hamotzi only if one made a meal out of this dish (like other pat haba b’kisnin foods), or even if he just ate it casually as a snack or at the end of the meal. According to the Magen Avraham, unlike pat haba b’kisnin, this dish requires a hamotzi even if one is not kove'a a seuda over it, since it is normally eaten as a meal. However, the Taz disagrees and says that pashtida should be treated as any other pat haba b’kisnin and therefore one would make a mezonot over it unless he were eating it as a meal. The Mishna Berura rules that unless one is clearly eating pashtida casually, at the end of the meal like a snack food, then he should recite hamotzi on it even if he is not being kove'a seuda (like the Magen Avraham) because unlike other foods, which are pat haba b’kisnin, these foods are normally eaten as a meal.

Based on the above, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is quoted as saying (Halachos of Brochos, pg. 500, fn. 47) that since in Israel pizza is normally eaten as a meal unto itself one should recite a hamotzi before eating it and a birchat hamazon afterwards. In America, where pizza is sometimes eaten as a snack and sometimes as a meal one should, in the opinion of Rav Auerbach, only make a hamotzi on pizza if he is eating it as a meal, otherwise he should treat it as he would any other pat haba b’kisnin.

Based on everything mentioned above, it would appear that if one is eating pizza for her meal she should wash and recite a hamotzi on it, for whether or not we view pizza as regular pat haba b’kisnin or as pashtida, once a person has determined to be kove'a seuda on it the beracha is a hamotzi. What still remains unclear though, is what a person should do if all they plan on eating is one slice of pizza as a snack or to hold them over until the next meal. Although there seem to be many poskim who hold that since pizza is categorized as "meal food" (as it is classified by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach) and therefore deserves a hamotzi in all cases, one should consult their Rav for guidance in this particular situation.

More Parsha Re-Runs

Last year I discussed the rule of 'ד' וה in the Stream: 
When discussing the din of daled v'heh, the super penalty imposed on a thief who is caught having slaughtered or sold an ox or a lamb that he stole, of four and five times the value of what was stolen,the most common question addressed is why there is a discrepancy between the ox and the lamb.  Various explanations are offered, including a well known  approach in Rashi.  The more interesting questions to me are why this entire parsha exists to begin with.  Why is stealing an ox or sheep worse than stealing any other animal, or any object for that matter?  What makes selling or slaughtering the ill gotten animal more deserving of punishment than  any other use?  To answer these questions we must look back into our nation's history. Who is the shor who was sold?  When was the seh not slaughtered?  These  seem to be clear references to the high and low points is Jewish history. Yitzchak, who was in place of the lamb, was spared at the last moment, but his and his father's willingness to sacrifice his life represent a peak of commitment to Hashem.  The sale of Yosef, the ox, by his brothers was a monumental black spot on our people's collective blueprint.  The reliving of this disaster for sin by selling the stolen ox is particularly egregious.  Committing a crime that recalls the akeida, but perverting the ending so that the lamb is actually slaughtered is especially  offensive, and they justify an added penalty.  To go a bit further, perhaps these two stories represent the two major mitigating factors that help us all whenever we sin: z'chus avos (the Akeida) and the possibility of tshuva (m'chiras Yosef).  By incorporating these two factors into the act of his sin, this particular thief loses some of their benefits and magnifies his own sin.  Finally, as to the specific numbers of four and five times what he stole, perhaps this can be explained in the following manner.  In the aseres hadibros, Hashem says He is "poked avon avos al banim, al shileishim v'al ribeim".  Sins are recalled for three to four generations - or three to four times the amount "earned" by the sinner, while mitzvos remain for thousands.  Perhaps the message here is that even that excess  punishment of three to four generations is tempered by zchus avos - someone in the last thousand generations had some zchusim.  Thus, when the thief shuns zchus avos, his retribution is more than the usual three to four times the value of the act, or four or five times as much.

This year I finally found a source that addresses the question of why these to thefts have a special penalty.  The מדרש says that the שור represents the חטא העגל, and the שה represents יוסף.  I don't quite get that symbolism, but it's good to see the question discussed.

YU Seforim Sale

Looking for something to learn? Something inspirational to read? Some good Jewish music? YU is having their annual seforim sale now. Check out the schedule at http://soyseforim.org/. It ends soon (Feb. 15th)!

Can we really hear a Bat Kol (Divine Voice)???

*These ideas are partially drawn from Rabbi Lamm’s book The Shema

There is a Mishna in Avot that always intrigued me. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that every day a bat kol (Divine Voice) comes down from Har Sinai. What does that actually mean? I never heard the voice!!

The Chief Rabbi of Trier explains that Hashem chose to reveal Himself to us at Har Sinai through the medium of sound because it is the least dimensional. This enables us to view God as a limitless Being, as well as His commandments as limitless. Had God revealed himself to us through the medium of sight, we might have thought that God is what we saw and no more, and that God’s commandments are limited.

What does it mean that there is a Divine Voice from Har Sinai evey single day? It is another way of saying that we are constantly being commanded to fulfill what Hashem says; we are constantly supposed to be responding to Hashem’s Will. Being a Jew is not limited to certain times and circumstances, rather it is something that affects every moment of our lives.

In practice: When we watch a movie, we can think to ourselves, “What messages can I take away from this movie that might contribute to my growth as a Jewish person?” When we meet a new person, we can think to ourselves, “What can I learn from this person that might help me work on my character?”

More on Slavery

In response to yesterday's post, my chavrusa, Rabbi Josh Weinberger pointed out the following:

I agree with your general point . The Rambam in the last halacha of hilchos avadim which is also the last halacha of sefer kinyan, makes exactly the point that not everything that is mutar is a good idea and in fact we are obligated because of vehalachta bidrachav to be "nicer" than shuras hadin requires.

Here is the Rambam:

יב  [ח] מותר לעבוד בעבד כנעני בפרך.  ואף על פי שהדין כך, מידת חסידות ודרכי החכמה שיהיה אדם רחמן ורודף צדק, ולא יכביד עולו על עבדו ולא יצר לו, ויאכילהו וישקהו מכל מאכלו ומכל משקהו.  חכמים הראשונים היו נותנין לעבד מכל תבשיל ותבשיל שהיו אוכלין, ומקדימין מזון הבהמות והעבדים על סעודת עצמן.  הרי הוא אומר "כעיני עבדים, אל יד אדוניהם--כעיני שפחה, אל יד גברתה" (תהילים קכג,ב).  וכן לא יבזהו, לא ביד ולא בדברים:  לעבדות מסרן הכתוב, לא לבושה.  ולא ירבה עליו צעקה וכעס, אלא ידבר עימו בנחת, וישמע טענותיו.  וכן מפורש בדרכי איוב הטובים שהשתבח בהן "אם אמאס--משפט עבדי, ואמתי:  בריבם, עימדי.  . . . הלוא בבטן, עושני עשהו; ויכוננו, ברחם אחד" (איוב לא,יג-טו).

 יג  ואין האכזרייות והעזות מצויה אלא בגויים הערלים.  אבל זרעו של אברהם אבינו, והם ישראל שהשפיע להם הקדוש ברוך הוא טובת התורה וציוום בחוקים ומשפטים צדיקים--רחמנים הם על הכול.  וכן במידותיו של הקדוש 

ברוך הוא שציוונו להידמות בהם, הוא אומר "ורחמיו, על כל מעשיו" (תהילים קמה,ט).  וכל המרחם--מרחמין עליו, שנאמר "ונתן לך רחמים וריחמך והרבך" (דברים יג,יח.(

(I can't find a translation on-line - let me know if you need one.)  The basic ideas are that while it is technically permitted to work your עבד כנעני arduously, it is inappropriate to do so, and everyone should be merciful with their slaves.  And early chachamim would give them the same food that they would eat, and be sure that they ate first, as the passuk says (Tehillim) "Like the eyes of a slave to his master, of a maidservant to her master [so to should our eyes be to Hashem].  And you shouldn't embarrass or scream at them or get angry at them, but rather should speak gently and listen to their complaints...

And cruelty and stubbornness are not traits of Jews who are merciful to all, just as of Hashem it says (Tehillim) "His mercy is upon all".

This got me thinking that there might be two other reasons for the Torah's tolerance of slavery.  First, conceptually it is valuable for the construct of slavery to exist to give us a model for our relationship with Hashem.  To this point, Rabbi Weinberger insightfully responded that "all of the avinu av harachaman and avinu malkeinu becomes much more meaningful as a parent and specifically seeing how difficult to remain patient as a parent even if we love our children.  Never thought about that with avdus -- but I guess that's why the rambam quotes the pasuk of ke-einei avadim el adoneihem".  The Sefer Hachinuch talks about an idea like this regarding kibbud av v'em, which is famously placed on the בין אדם למקום side of the עשרת הדברות.  He says that our relationship with our parents is the closest tangible thing to our relationship with Hashem, and therefore, a reason for the mitzva is to train us to relate בין אדם למקום.

Additionally, perhaps even practically the institution is valuable to give us a laboratory to practice v'halachta b'drachav, outside of formal halacha - to see if the bigger messages of the detailed mitzvos got across.  By giving us a context in which we may indulge many of our worst instincts and character traits within the formal boundaries of the halacha, we are then challenged to rise above it, לפנים משורת הדין, and emulate the ways of Hashem in the way that we treat the most vulnerable members of society, and recognizing, that relative to Him, we are עבדים, and we expect and receive His mercy.

I would love some reaction to these ideas, so the inbox is open.

SNOW DAY!!!

Here are a few articles about snow.  Have a great day.

Slavery Re-run

Here are some thoughts posted last year about a topic that always comes up this time of year:

Each year, at פרשת משפטים, the subject of the Torah allowing and regulating slavery troubles many of us. While this issue is clearly bigger than can be adequately addressed in a blog post, here are a couple of notes. First, just because the Torah allows something, doesn't mean that it endorses it. There some things that are permitted, but are still considered to be a bad idea. For example, we all know that polygamy is permitted by Torah law, but what is its attitude towards polygamy? Being that every case in Tanach (am I missing any?) in which we learn about a man marrying multiple wives ends badly, I don't think we should consider that an endorsement.


Another idea to consider is one that I found from Rav Kook. Don't worry, it's not very long.

While neither of these fully address this complicated issue, to me they are a starting point in trying to better understand the Torah's position.

In the Spirit of the Superbowl...

Here's an interesting article about a former NFL player who talks about his relationship to Judaism.

Lights and TV's on Shabbos

Sophie Satloff asks:

Hi, I was wondering why you are allowed to keep lights on during shabbos, or even have them on timers, if you are not allowed to keep you t.v on all shabbos (without physically changing any channels)?

Dear Sophie,

 

Good question. There are two differences between lights and televisions.

 

First, there is an issur miderabanan, a prohibition from the rabbis, known as "avsha milta." This means that if melacha is taking place in my house during Shabbat in a loud or boisterous fashion, it is assur, even if I did not actually perform that melacha on Shabbat (Rama Orach Chaim 252:5). For example, leaving on a washing machine or radio on Shabbat is a violation of "avsha milta" (Teshuvat Minchat Yitzchak 1:107). The reason for this issur is that attention is drawn to the melacha, and the onlooker may think that I violated melacha on Shabbat. Leaving on a television is pretty noticeable and would probably violate avsha milta, as opposed to leaving on lights, which is certainly not loud and attracts less attention than a television.

 

Second, leaving on a television is probably a violation of uvda de-chol, creating an inappropriate weekday-like atmosphere on Shabbat (see Gemara Masechet Shabbat 143b). Although it's hard to pin down exactly what falls under this concept, leaving on lights, while something we do during the weekday, is generally cosidered less of a "weekday-like activity" and is therefore assumed to be OK.

Making Aliyot II

A couple of weeks ago, we talked about how the עליות for קריאת התורה were divided.  Since then I read this article on the subject which was honestly a lot more interesting than I thought it would be, which is the good news.  Here is his summary of the various considerations that motivated the traditional divisions (as opposed to the Yemenite tradition, which he explains is very different):

1. The divisors sought to achieve a balance between maintaining the integrity of the biblical narrative and having ‘aliyot of relatively even lengths. It is important, however, not to attempt to read too much into the bundling together of seemingly discrete passages into a single ‘aliyah; often, the consideration is no more esoteric than a simple desire to maintain a consistent ‘aliyah length.
2. The divisors sought to amplify the hidden connections between seemingly unrelated passages and thereby tease out homiletical messages.
3. As a consequence of principle 2, the divisors placed only secondary emphasis on concluding each aliyah at the end of a physical paragraph (“parasha”).
4. The divisors endowed the concluding words of aliyot with far greater significance than did the Yemenites. Thus:

• Negative endings containing words dealing with curses, impurity, punishment, destruction and death were avoided if at all possible.

• Similarly, positive endings containing expressions of blessing were targeted.

5. The divisors sought to end aliyot at dramatic junctures in the narrative, rather than encompassing the entire narrative section within a single discrete ‘aliyah. Thereby, they sought to preserve a sense both of narrative suspense and of continuity between adjacent aliyot.

He brings the examples that I mentioned in פרשת וארא as an illustration of #4, confirming the theory of my Baal koreh friend.

The bad news is that he doesn't address Rebecca's question, for what I then realized is an obvious reason.  In that case (starting an עליה right before the final of יעקב's ברכות [Binyamin's] in פרשת ויחי), the עליה follows the division of the Torah into Parshiyot - not the way we use the term, but the physical breaks in the Torah text, represented by פ or ס in our chumashim.  Therefore the question is why that was broken up that way, a decision that goes far further back in our tradition, and requires me to read another article.  I'll update if I find anything out.

Beli Ayin Hara

From Alona Stewart:
I was just wondering-- what's the difference between an ayin hara and superstition? A lot of the things people do to "prevent" an ayin hara seem a lot like superstition to me.

This answer is based on the research done for a shiur that my husband gave several years ago. I tried to get him to write the post, but no dice.

The idea of ayin hara is well-documented in our sources. To choose just one well-known occurrence of very many: Rashi (from Gemara Berachot 20a) on the brachah of “Ha-Malach ha-Go’el” that Yaakov gives to his grandsons (Bereishit 48:16) says the word וידגו is used because Yaakov hopes they will be like fish, which increase and multiply without the ayin hara having dominion over them. (Other sources: Rashi Shemot 30:12 – the story of how Bnei Yisrael were to be counted, and Bemidbar 24:2 – the story of Bil’am) The ayin hara seems to be specifically associated with counting people. The Gemara, however, doesn’t really define exactly what the phenomenon of ayin hara is.

There are at least four ways that later interpreters approach the concept of ayin hara:

1. Medical – Abarbanel, at the beginning of Parshat Ki Tisa, writes, based on Greek science, that there is actually some harm that could be caused by one person looking at another with bad intentions, just as one person hitting another causes harm. Our current science no longer believes in harm caused by looking, which leads to a big question of how to proceed when our science differs from that of earlier poskim. That is a whole other post.
2. Mystical/Metaphysical – counting, or otherwise drawing attention to someone, and can evoke an ayin hara, which is a harmful force in the universe. This is the approach taken by works of Kabbalah such as the Zohar.
3. Psychological/Metaphysical – when one draws attention to oneself (by enumerating how many children one has, for example, or flaunting fancy possessions) it causes the attention of Heaven to be focused on the one who singles himself out. Hashem will re-examine that person’s account book, and since everyone has some sins, this leads to punishment. Rabbenu Bechaye and Seforno, though they do not mention the words “ayin hara” specifically, take this approach in Shemot 30:2 where Hashem commands that Bnei Yisrael not be counted directly, but by the half-shekel method.
4. Ayin hara doesn’t matter – Whenever the Gemara gives “ayin hara” as the reason for a mitzvah, Rambam gives a different reason unrelated to ayin hara when he codifes the mitzvah. This led at least two acharonim, R. Tzvi Hirsch Chajes and R. Matisyahu Strashun, to conclude that according to Rambam, ayin hara should not be taken into consideration when determining our behavior.
All these approaches are valid in the sources, and thus it behooves us to take care in areas specifically mentioned by Chazal, such as counting ourselves directly, whether it is specifically because of ayin hara or for another reason (like Rambam would say). Adding our own strictures (R. Moshe Feinstein gives an example of someone who is afraid to say that she’s expecting a baby), however, is not necessary.