Saving the life of a non-Jew on Shabbos

Talia Friedman asked: Could you violate shabbos to save a non-Jew's life?

The reason I love this question is because there are so many halachic and hashkafic elements subsumed within it. Rather than address each of these issues completely (which would take the four huge booklets worth of mekorot sheets that I have from shiurim given by Rabbi Dr. Howard Apfel) I will at least try to highlight what some of the issues are:

1. The gemara in Avodah Zara, 26a discusses whether a Jewish midwife may deliver a non-Jewish baby on shabbos. Though me'ikar ha'din (the strict letter of the law), doing so is assur, the emoraim discuss possible heterim (allowances) including the concept of 'aiva'-literally 'hatred.' According to the concept of aiva, not delivering the non-Jewish baby, and by extension, not saving the non-Jew's life on shabbos, would incite hostility toward that Jewish midwife in particular, and to the Jewish nation in general.

2. Tosfot on this gemara brings up the issue of de'oraita vs. de'rabanan. Do we allow violation of all shabbos halachot due to the fear of aiva? Or may only de'rabanans on shabbos be violated? Most rishonim, including the Ramban, Sefer ha'trumot, and the Ritvah hold that only de'rabanans may be violated mishum aiva (because of hatred). Rav Ovadia Yosef says that saving a non-Jewish life on shabbos falls under the category of melacha she'aina tzricha le'gufa, because I am not doing the melachot for their specific function but simply in order to not be fired/ to not garner anti-semitism. Therefore all violations done to save a non-Jewish life become melachot she'ainan tzrichot le'gufan, and all become de'rabanans. This solves the de'oraita/de'rabanan dilemna.

According to the Chatam Sofer, the doctor may violate de'oraitas because not doing so would mean risking his own life (due to possible anti-semitism that may result). The Tzitz Eliezer expands this to say that the whole of am yisrael may be put in danger by one Jew's refusal to treat a non-Jew on shabbos. (Think about what would happen if all the non-Jewish doctors in the world decided to stop treating Jews).

3. Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach addresses the question-what if Aiva is not an issue, because you're on a deserted island and no one will ever find out whether you could have saved this non-Jew's life but didn't. He says Aiva still would exist as a Matir (allowance) in this instance, because you never know when word can get out.

4. Hashkafic issues: How do we deal with the fact that me'ikar hadin-it is assur to save a non-Jew's life on shabbos?

a)One important point to make is that we have an ideal in Judaim that the command of Gd must come before any of our own ethical conceptions. As Rav Soloveitchik says (in a shiur made at the RCA convention in 1975)-this is a crucial component of accepting "ol malchut shamayim"-the burden of heaven. Noteworthy is the fact that Rav Soloveitchik is quoted by Rav Yaakov Blidstein as saying, "'...I have always ruled that one saves the lives of Gentiles, because if we don't permit this, they won't treat our sick ones.' I asked him if this reason satisfied him from an ethical standpoint, and he replied, 'No, from an ethical standpoint it does not satisfy me.'" Obviously, the conflict between our own sense of morality and our subservience to the Ratzon Hashem is not a simple one to resolve.

b) Another important point to make is that violating shabbos for any reason-even saving a Jewish life, is not simple. The gemara in yoma 85a brings 7 different pssukim in attempts to find the source for pikuach nefesh on shabbos. Though the gemara concludes with "Ve'chay bahem"-ve'lo she'yamut bahem, as the ultimate source, the fact that all 7 are quoted may imply that we need the weight of all 7 to justify violating shabbos at all. The Gr"a says that there is no greater sin then violating shabbos.

c) We may be able reread the gemara in Avoda Zara by reinterpreting the type of non-Jew who falls within the scope of the gemara. The gemara talks about "Ovdei Kochavim." In a famous statement by the Meiri on Avoda Zara perek 2, he says that people of other monotheistic religions who subscribe to principles of morality do not fall under the category of "ovdei kochavim" who are by definition "impure in their actions, and ugly in their Middot." Rav Kook in Iggrot Ha're'iya seems to agree with the position of the Meiri. In that case, the obligation to save a Jewish life on shabbos would be the same as that to save of the life of a morally upright non-Jew.

I really feel like I have not done this topic justice, so please ask any follow up questions you may have, and I or someone else can elaborate!