The First Seder

And it wasn't in Egypt!

Divrei Torah about Pesach

Check out yutorah.org and click on Pesach-to-Go. Article by Mrs. Knoll is included!!

Post-שבת הגדול Drasha

• On the advice of our lunch guest, I found Tzipporah's answer to Friday's question in the ערוך השולחן.  He also gives another answer:  The splitting of the Yarden, a lesser miracle, also took place on י' ניסן, and we don't want to dilute the celebration of the miracles of מצרים by adding other miracles.  It was apparently quite a day.  It's interesting that we don't find a similar concern for אבילות on Tisha B'av or י"ז תמוז, where we have many reasons for mourning, some more powerful than others.  Even at the ליל הסדר, we associate the night with other historical miracles that occurred through the generations - see ויהי בחצי הלילה.
• An anonymous student also pointed out that the Drasha by the Rabbi (= Gadol) is one of the suggested reasons for the name שבת הגדול.

• Rabbi Zev Rifkin, a local Rosh Kollel spoke about בדיקת חמץ.  He asked, no matter how good a בדיקה we do, it's not fully sufficient - are we re-examining the oven?  So he defended the current "minhag" of doing only a cursory / ceremonial search, and says that once we have spent weeks cleaning and searching for chametz, all of the rooms in our home are בחזקת בדוק, and no longer require בדיקה at all.  If so, how do we justify our ברכה?  Isn't it לבטלה?  Therefore, he said that it is appropriate to leave a small section of your home uncleaned at all  (a cabinet, a knapsack etc.), and do that during בדיקת חמץ, in addition to the charade of finding the 10 pieces of chametz that are set out.  I mean to check with other Rabbanim to see if this is a mainstream view.

A "Great" Answer

From Tzipporah Herzfeld:

So I don't know if this is the answer, but I read something that Rabbi Yossi Marcus wrote online that the 10th of Nissan, when we should be celebrating the mitzvah of the korban Pesach, was also the date that Miriam died. So we celebrate the mitzvah of the korban on the Shabbos before Pesach because the 10th of Nissan was established as an unofficial fast day to commemorate Miriam's death, therefore we shouldn't be celebrating anything on that day.


Yasher Koach!

The Big Day

We're just a couple of hours from שבת הגדול.  My daughter thought that it was שבת הגדה, which is not that far off, as one of the only minhagim for the day is to say a portion of the Hagada on שבת afternoon.  (It also makes a nice parallel to the commonly misstated שבת תשובה.)  You might also have thought that it got its name from the other minhag - that the Rav (or Gadol) gives a דרשה - a lengthy talk usually divided between lomdus, halacha and hashkafa.  Really it is called שבת הגדול - "the Great Shabbat" - because it is when the great miracles started in Mitzrayim.  That year, the 10th of Nissan, when the Jews took the קרבן פסח into their home while the angry Egyptian could do nothing but watch, was on שבת. 

It is curious that we celebrate it on the day of the week (like Thanksgiving or Memorial Day), rather than celebrating the calendar date - like all other significant days in Jewish life.  The באר היטב asks the question, and points us to the חוות יאיר (I assume), which I haven't had a chance to look up yet.  If anyone knows the answer, please let me know.

Have a "great" Shabbos.

Post Script on Saving Non-Jews on שבת

It has been pointed out to me that my response to this question addressed some of the fundamental and difficult issues rising from the question that Talia asked, but never actually answered the question.  I'd like to do that now.

Talia asked: Could you violate shabbos to save a non-Jew's life?

The answer is an emphatic and undisputed yes.  Of course, if human life of any variety is in danger, the Torah's unequivocal position is to save the person in trouble without any hesitation.  The reason that the Gemara gives for this rule is the subject of all of the conversation below, but the psak could not be clearer.

It's That Time of Year Again

In what is becoming a Why-aanot annual tradition, I offer a little something to help get us ready for Pesach.

Science and Torah - Some Book Recommendations

Several students have asked questions about reconciling the Torah's account of creation with the science of evolution. Instead of writing my own answer, I refer you to people who have said it much more knowledgeably and eloquently than I. A classic work is Challenge: Torah Views on Science and Its Problems edited by Aryeh Carmell and Cyril Domb, and published by Feldheim. Note the plural "views" in its title. Anyone who tells you he has the one-and-only Torah-true view on any subject probably hasn't learned all the sources. A more recent work is The Challenge of Creation by Natan Slifkin. He also goes through many different approaches to this important question. The work of Gerald Schroeder, a cosmologist, and Nathan Aviezer, a biologist, is also helpful but pretty heavy on the science.

May you always create new worlds for yourselves as your learning evolves.

The Storm and Chametz

One thought that comes to mind when thinking about the storm is how utterly dependent on God we are for everything. We often take for granted the "simple" things like electricity, water, and think that because we are so technologically advanced we are also self-sufficient. It is events such as this storm that allow us to remember that despite our achievements, God is the source of them all and can intervene as He chooses. This motif is woven throughout the holiday of Pesach.
I'm sure you can come up with a whole list--here's one interesting example:
The Netziv, among many others, grapples with the question of what is so bad about eating chametz. He writes as follows:
Scripture calls all substances which have a sweetening effect 'honey' because honey is the classic sweetener. As for leaven [what makes dough rise] se'or is a human manipulation of the natural state of God's universe. It is an exercise of human machination. He writes elsewhere: ... matza takes no advantage of the human technological ingenuity and creativity which allows man to raise the dough more than simple flour and water which are created by God. Chametz is the epitome of human involvement in nature. Thus, non-leaven is the symbol of the survival and ongoing existence of the Jewish People as they survive solely through the spirit of God."
According to the Netziv, Matzah symbolizes our utter dependence on God, while chametz symbolizes human intervention in nature that is often accompanied by the false perception that WE are the source of our achievements. As we enter Chodesh Nissan perhaps we can think about this lesson that is embedded both in the storm and in the matzah that we will soon eat. Chodesh Tov!

One Last Point...

When you see later authorities explaining a troubling earlier source in a way at first that seems to be a stretch, realize that this is not apologetics covering up for embarrassing earlier statements by our religious leaders, but attempts to reconcile single, minority sources with the mainstream Torah literature on a subject.  For example, regarding the Meiri's opinion cited below, there are countless sources in Tanach and Torah sheb'al peh that teach that all people are created בצלם אלוקים and upholding the dignity and value of all human life.  So when we see the Gemara seemingly ruling against that principle, it becomes the job of the commentaries to interpret the passage is a way that is coherent with its whole.

שבת, the Value of Life, and Troubling Texts

The issue of violating שבת to save the life of a non-Jew is not new to Why-aanot.  It has been a favorite tidbit of anti-Semites for generations, and has kept many Rabbis busy explaining the rationale by which it is permitted, encouraged and required.  In fact, just a few years ago it was all over the news, when Noah Feldman, a lawyer, diplomat and sometimes journalist published "Orthodox Paradox" in the New York Times Magazine.  While much of the substance of the essay - which detailed him being ostracized by the Modern Orthodox world in which he grew up following his intermarriage - turned out to be fabricated, he took the occasion to air what he considered to be some dirty laundry of his former community.  Included in his attacks, was a bizarre anecdote from his high school years in which a tragically misguided (or worse) Rabbi erroneously claimed that fundamentally, the rule is to allow the non-Jew to die, and that one who saves him for universal or altruistic reasons about the value of his life, is considered to have been מחלל שבת.  Whether the story is true or not, the rule is nonsense, with no basis in any Torah sources.  Once that Gemara hit the open press, a major uproar ensued, with responses from many diverse sources.

Previous posters have addressed most of the significant approaches to making sense of the Gemara.  Ms. Schwartz (in her last point) mentioned the position of the Meiri, which was restated at that time by Rabbi Shmuely Boteach in the Jerusalem Post.

Rabbi Lamm published a response that basically argued that what mattered was the end result, not the legalistic minutiae that led to that result.  This piece of his response was very controversial.  (

He also called Feldman out for publicizing the controversial Gemara so publicly.  He quoted a letter he recieved:
"You apparently were equally unaware of the damage your words have caused to innocent bystanders. Example: Daniel _____, a recent graduate of Yeshiva University, wrote this letter to me that broke my heart:

Like most Yeshiva University graduates, I interact on a daily basis with gentiles for most of my day. My Orthodox Jewish identity has never become an issue or conflict. However, following last week’s New York Times article by Noah Feldman… I have frequently been getting questions like, ‘Is it true that according to your law you wouldn’t save my life on the Sabbath’ or, ‘Do you really believe that Jewish life is more important than gentile life?’ How does a young Modern Orthodox professional answer these questions in a respectful and diplomatic way so as not to demonize others and at the same time be true to his faith?

My dear Noah Feldman, it is your duty to answer him, because you are the cause of his discomfiture and perhaps his possible inability to find employment."

This argument was attacked here. I am ambivalent, and hear both sides of the argument, though I wonder what expectations of responsibility we can reasonably expect from someone as obviously bitter and alienated as Feldman.

Another approach, mentions by Ms. Schwartz, and highlighted by Rabbi Prince is expanded upon by Rabbi Sholom Carmy.  Here is a passage:

In settling his scores with his alma mater, Feldman ascribes to his high school rebbi the claim that a doctor who treats a Gentile on Shabbat violates the day unless his explicit intention is to do so only in order to avoid animus. Though this sounds like nonsense, I am informed that a high school teacher actually said it.
The insinuation that religious Jewish doctors cannot be entrusted with the care of non-Jewish patients was, as we all know, part of the arsenal of 19th century European anti-Semitism. It was not meant in earnest: as an Orthodox deputy once remarked, during a debate on the licensing of physicians in the Austrian Parliament, several of the most outspoken leaders of the anti-Semitic party used Jewish doctors.
An honest understanding of the Halakha about saving a Gentile on Shabbat is grounded in the fact that not all mitsvot can be violated to save life. Idolatry, sexual offenses and murder may not be allowed even to save life, however this flies in the face of our utilitarian mentality. Shabbat has much in common with the so-called “big three.” [Note R. Shimon’s view in Yerushalmi that a bystander may intervene to prevent Shabbat violation even at the cost of the transgressor’s life.] For Jews Shabbat may be violated to save life, but only on the basis of a special limmud (inference)—“desecrate one Shabbat so that he may observe many Shabbatot.” Where this principle does not apply, Shabbat is inviolable.
Where people understand that religion may on occasion make life and death demands, the law that Shabbat is so important that it is overridden only for those who are members of the community that observes it is difficult but not scandalous. In our culture this understanding is lacking; thus the failure to treat Jews and Gentiles identically will be interpreted as indifference to the fate of the non-Jew, and will be perceived as tantamount to connivance in his death. It will provoke hatred, and understandably so. In this case, the theoretical gulf separating secularists from halakhists is not universalism vs. particularism but the recognition that Shabbat is, in principle, worth the sacrifice. It is common to stress that Judaism, compared, let us say, with Hinduism, affirms the value of human life and eschews such sacrifices. That the value of human life is overridden only in exceptional circumstances is a significant element in generalizing about Jewish ethics. But an almost absolute principle is not the same as an absolute one.

After all of these authorities, there is little to add, except to reiterate something that I have discussed with most of you before.   Anyone who learns Torah on a serious basis will occasionally encounter texts and sources that make her uncomfortable - be it on the subject of slavery, women, non-Jews, homosexuality etc.  Sometimes this is a result of the influence of Western culture, which we would not expect to be identical to the Torah world-view.  More often, we misinterpret the sources, and if we're lucky, are eventually corrected.  Most common though, we don't know which of these is true, and are left with a difficult, sometimes even painful clash between what we read in the Torah and what feels right to us.

I heard from my Rebbe an idea from the חובות הלבבות on this subject.  He noted that our conscious was also created by Hashem, and therefore it too is a valid means of determining His will.  However, just as if we were to (in theory, of course) have a contradiction between תורה שבכתב and תורה שבעל פה, we would follow the written תורה, because it is a more direct pipeline of the 'רצון ד, with less risk of the message being corrupted, our conscious is subject to influence from all kinds of places that could corrupt God's original message, so it is overruled when it conflicts with the תורה.

In the end, when confronted with these kinds of sources, I think we can safely discuss them on a forum like this, air our struggles, exchange ideas etc.  But most important is that the conversation take place within a context of intellectual humility.  The fact that I don't understand something now, doesn't mean I won't next week or next year or 10 years from now.  Maybe my daughter or great-grandson will figure it out, or maybe he won't.  To draw broad and definitive conclusions implies breadth of knowledge and depth of insight that most of us would be hard pressed to claim.  Patience, and a certain willingness to at least temporarily subordinate our own thought process to the broader Divine command is a core element of emuna (נעשה ונשמע), and one that we would do well to keep in mind (though again, one need not be a מאמין to try to avoid the pitfalls of intellectual hubris). 

No, I haven't graded your tests yet.

Saving a Non-Jew's Life on Shabbat (a matter of perspective)

Just to add a word to Ms. Schwartz’s comments, specifically one of the last points she makes:

“Violating shabbos for any reason-even saving a Jewish life, is not simple. The gemara in Yoma 85a[-b], brings 7 different pessukim in attempts to find the source for pikuach nefesh on shabbos. Though the gemara concludes with "Ve'chay bahem"-ve'lo she'yamut bahem, as the ultimate source, the fact that all 7 are quoted may imply that we need the weight of all 7 to justify violating shabbos at all. The Gr"a says that there is no greater sin then violating shabbos”.

I think this point is a particularly important one because it frames the discussion in a whole different light. Because of the naturally unpleasant reaction this Halacha engenders both by us Torah observant Jews (as discussed by Mrs. Appel), as well as those less familiar with Torah law, the question is usually asked and answered with the focus being on why and how the Torah could even entertain the possibility that a non-Jew be allowed to die simply because a Jew refuses to do melacha on Shabbat. I think perhaps that we should look at the issue differently. It is not that we love the non-Jew any less, but that we love the Shabbat more than almost anything else- to the extent that the Gemara (at least in its most basic understanding) needs to find a source which would allow us to violate Shabbat under any circumstances even to save the life of a Jew. Chazal were aware that pikuach nefesh doche Shabbat applies under all circumstances and yet they struggled to find a suitable source for why. Once we are no longer dealing with a Jew though, and our arguments and our sources which allow for the desecration of Shabbat disappear, we must then ask the question again this time relying on new sources and other rationale.

Fallout From the Snow

For many of us, last week's snowstorm served as a reminder of the rule against Hotza'a - carrying in public on שבת, as the eruv was down in many Jewish communities for the first time in recent memory.  This phenomenon was addressed in today's NY Times.  Often when the details of our observance are broadcast to the general public (an issue somewhat related to the other topic at hand here, which I hope to address soon), the results can be less than ideal, if not even embarrassing, but I think we did OK here.

Saving a Non-Jew's Life on Shabbat (an additional perspective)

I’d like to add a few thoughts regarding Talia’s question about saving a non-Jew’s life on Shabbat. This is the type of question that I find very difficult to consider within the abstract parameters of hypothetical situations, and so while I leave it to the halakhic experts at Ma’ayanot to deliver the kind of multi-faceted explanations that Ms. Schwartz has offered us, I would like to supplement them:

I think that when we consider pikuah nefesh from an abstract perspective, we risk losing a certain degree of our own status as tzelem Elokim by ignoring the notion that this feature characterizes all people. I don’t think we have to look outside our own tradition – originating in Tanakh itself – to suggest that it is abhorrent to entertain the possibility of having the opportunity to save a human life and opting not to do so because of an ungrounded assumption about the lesser value of a non-Jew’s life. Moreover, the idea that any one of us, faced with such a situation, would first stop to think about the halakhic ramifications of violating Shabbat relative to whether a person is Jewish or not (while perhaps losing precious time as a person is dying) makes my stomach turn. And so, with all the respect I have for due process in halakha, and for attempts to ground hashkafic perspectives in the basis of halakha, I would hope that our students recognize that if we aspire to emulate G-d Himself, then in this type of scenario, determining the value of a human life based on whether or not a person is Jewish requires a good deal of hubris that is not warranted in any one of us.

Saving the life of a non-Jew on Shabbos

Talia Friedman asked: Could you violate shabbos to save a non-Jew's life?

The reason I love this question is because there are so many halachic and hashkafic elements subsumed within it. Rather than address each of these issues completely (which would take the four huge booklets worth of mekorot sheets that I have from shiurim given by Rabbi Dr. Howard Apfel) I will at least try to highlight what some of the issues are:

1. The gemara in Avodah Zara, 26a discusses whether a Jewish midwife may deliver a non-Jewish baby on shabbos. Though me'ikar ha'din (the strict letter of the law), doing so is assur, the emoraim discuss possible heterim (allowances) including the concept of 'aiva'-literally 'hatred.' According to the concept of aiva, not delivering the non-Jewish baby, and by extension, not saving the non-Jew's life on shabbos, would incite hostility toward that Jewish midwife in particular, and to the Jewish nation in general.

2. Tosfot on this gemara brings up the issue of de'oraita vs. de'rabanan. Do we allow violation of all shabbos halachot due to the fear of aiva? Or may only de'rabanans on shabbos be violated? Most rishonim, including the Ramban, Sefer ha'trumot, and the Ritvah hold that only de'rabanans may be violated mishum aiva (because of hatred). Rav Ovadia Yosef says that saving a non-Jewish life on shabbos falls under the category of melacha she'aina tzricha le'gufa, because I am not doing the melachot for their specific function but simply in order to not be fired/ to not garner anti-semitism. Therefore all violations done to save a non-Jewish life become melachot she'ainan tzrichot le'gufan, and all become de'rabanans. This solves the de'oraita/de'rabanan dilemna.

According to the Chatam Sofer, the doctor may violate de'oraitas because not doing so would mean risking his own life (due to possible anti-semitism that may result). The Tzitz Eliezer expands this to say that the whole of am yisrael may be put in danger by one Jew's refusal to treat a non-Jew on shabbos. (Think about what would happen if all the non-Jewish doctors in the world decided to stop treating Jews).

3. Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach addresses the question-what if Aiva is not an issue, because you're on a deserted island and no one will ever find out whether you could have saved this non-Jew's life but didn't. He says Aiva still would exist as a Matir (allowance) in this instance, because you never know when word can get out.

4. Hashkafic issues: How do we deal with the fact that me'ikar hadin-it is assur to save a non-Jew's life on shabbos?

a)One important point to make is that we have an ideal in Judaim that the command of Gd must come before any of our own ethical conceptions. As Rav Soloveitchik says (in a shiur made at the RCA convention in 1975)-this is a crucial component of accepting "ol malchut shamayim"-the burden of heaven. Noteworthy is the fact that Rav Soloveitchik is quoted by Rav Yaakov Blidstein as saying, "'...I have always ruled that one saves the lives of Gentiles, because if we don't permit this, they won't treat our sick ones.' I asked him if this reason satisfied him from an ethical standpoint, and he replied, 'No, from an ethical standpoint it does not satisfy me.'" Obviously, the conflict between our own sense of morality and our subservience to the Ratzon Hashem is not a simple one to resolve.

b) Another important point to make is that violating shabbos for any reason-even saving a Jewish life, is not simple. The gemara in yoma 85a brings 7 different pssukim in attempts to find the source for pikuach nefesh on shabbos. Though the gemara concludes with "Ve'chay bahem"-ve'lo she'yamut bahem, as the ultimate source, the fact that all 7 are quoted may imply that we need the weight of all 7 to justify violating shabbos at all. The Gr"a says that there is no greater sin then violating shabbos.

c) We may be able reread the gemara in Avoda Zara by reinterpreting the type of non-Jew who falls within the scope of the gemara. The gemara talks about "Ovdei Kochavim." In a famous statement by the Meiri on Avoda Zara perek 2, he says that people of other monotheistic religions who subscribe to principles of morality do not fall under the category of "ovdei kochavim" who are by definition "impure in their actions, and ugly in their Middot." Rav Kook in Iggrot Ha're'iya seems to agree with the position of the Meiri. In that case, the obligation to save a Jewish life on shabbos would be the same as that to save of the life of a morally upright non-Jew.

I really feel like I have not done this topic justice, so please ask any follow up questions you may have, and I or someone else can elaborate!

More on Moshe Rabbeinu & the Evolution of Torah

Talia responded to Mrs. Block's post:

First of all, did Rabbi Akiva come up with the story about himself? Was it a dream? Was it his own justification?

Also why would Moshe be appeased and placated if he sees that he is misquoted and misinterpretated. The Rabbanim, Zichronim Le'bracha, use Moshe's name, to reinterpret Moshe-yet Moshe is satisfied to realized that he is quoted and misunderstood. Conversely he should be even more frustrated.
This response reminds me of the "Nitzchunee Banai" story with "Torah lo Mishemayim Hee" but there must be a limit. And if Rabbi Akiva recognized that he was interpretating something that was not meant to be interpretated, why didn't he stop?

Also, why don't we take reinterpretating the Torah to the extreme, and have a whole new book-like the New Testament? If we recognize, as Menachot 29b seems to imply, that the Rabbanim knew they were writing something Moshe had not originally intended, than what is wrong with having an entirely New Testament?

In response, we have another guest post by Rabbi Kenneth Schiowitz, Rabbi of Congregation Shaare Tefillah of Teaneck: 

On the first question, I do not know, but in the Talmud, the story is not told by Rebbe Akiva himself, but by a later rabbi, Rav. If anyone had an agenda in making up the story, it was probably to explain the whole assumption and basis of the process of Torah Shebaal Pe. Rebbe Akiva was not the only one to ever introduce a new idea that may not have been known to Moshe.


I agree with Mrs. Block that this gemarah is very relevant to this issue. I would add by expanding on the significance of the end of that story, that Rebbe Akiva attributed his teaching to "halacha leMoshe miSinia". Rebbe Akiva's work represented the dynamic and evolving nature of Torah and halacha. Nevertheless, they are all rooted in the tradition from Sinai, and evolved through the application of the principles that God taught Moshe. There is a limit, and there is a reason why we cannot make a whole new book. Because God taught Moshe rules and principles that he, and later Jews, will use in order to interpret the Torah. This is a dynamic process, but we are expected to be creative and innovative within the parameters that God told Moshe. Indeed, every novelty of Rebbe Akiva is based on the information and rules that were given to Moshe at Sinai. They do not represent misinterpretation but rather further development. Apparently, even Moshe did not anticipate all the wisdom that would be built upon the information that he transmitted to God and to the Jewish people, but ultimately felt nachat when seeing it.


It is as if a great 18th century scientist would be shown a vision of the first spaceship to travel to the moon in the 1960's. This is a possibility that was probably a wild dream in the 1700's. Imagine if he would discover in that vision that the ability for this to take place was all based on his discoveries from the 18th century. That would not be called a misinterpretation, but the application, and the building upon his own ideas. That would be great nachat!


Rebbe Akiva did interpret things the way that they were supposed to be interpreted, but maybe not by Moshe, but only by God. Yes, there is a limit. Innovation is the essence of the Torah Shebaal Pe, but they must be developed within the limits of the rules that were told at Sinai and that have been developed over the generations.


Interestingly, the gemarah of "nitzchuni banai" that you have referred to opens up another issue - that perhaps God Himself has created a system where more than one interpretation can be offered, within the limits of the rules. And incredibly, God left if for use to choose the interpretation to be followed in the halacha (through the rule of majority), even if it is not what He had in mind. Apparently, it is more important to God that this would become a human process than it be most accurate. If He sought perfection in the halacha, then He probably would have written the whole thing Himself.

Divinity of the Torah

Talia Friedman asked: Why do we believe God wrote the Torah? I know the Torah says so, but if I wrote a book I may also claim that. Why do you believe the Torah's claim to divinity?

I want to start by saying that I personally think that we can never 100% prove things such as God’s existence or that He wrote the Torah; I believe that religion by definition requires at least some leap of faith. Still, we can (and I think should) come up with arguments that make these fundamental beliefs more believable/logical so that the leap is a little less daunting. Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen has written 2 books on these topics: Permission to Believe, which presents arguments for God’s existence, and Permission to Receive, which offers arguments on behalf of the Torah’s Divinity. You may want to read them.

One of the arguments that I personally find one of the more convincing ones on behalf of the Torah’s authenticity is one that I think I first read in Rabbi Kelemen’s book. It is as follows:
There are only 2 possible explanations of how we have the book known as the Bible/Torah: The first possibility is that it was Divinely given on Mount Sinai as it itself describes. If that is NOT how it was given to mankind, then that would necessarily mean that some person at some point in history fabricated it (meaning he made the whole thing up and wrote it himself), brought it to the public, and lied, claiming that he had unearthed this amazing book written by God that had somehow gotten lost up until his amazing discovery. At first glance, the second possibility sounds more logical and likely than the possibility that God Himself spoke to an entire nation in the middle of the desert. However, if that is what happened, then why is there no record whatsoever of who this person was who brought the most important book in the history of the world to light??? Why do we not know anything about who this person was or when he/she lived??? The total lack of any mention of any such person or any such thing happening strongly indicates that it did not in fact happen – that there never was a person who at some later point in history brought the Bible to mankind. The only person ever mentioned as the one who brought this book to mankind is Moses, who is described as having received it on Mount Sinai directly from God Himself.

One might try to argue that perhaps Moses himself made the whole thing up. However, this possibility is highly unlikely, because in contrast to virtually all other religions, the Torah makes the claim that God revealed Himself to the entire nation - men, women, and children - in order to give this book. Moses could not possibly have come to the Children of Israel and given them a book that explicitly says in it that every single one of them saw God Himself on Mount Sinai if none of them actually experienced any such thing. It would have been a ridiculously blatant lie; the people would have laughed him off. So if Moses could not have made it up, and there is no record whatsoever of any other person later in history introducing this all-important book to the world, then the only remaining possible explanation as to how we have this book in our hands is that we received it exactly as it itself tells us we did – through Moses who got it directly from God Himself after He revealed Himself to the entire nation.

Again, I am not claiming that what I wrote above is indisputable (I can think of at least one strong argument that could possibly be made against it – if you’re interested, you can ask me in school). As I said at the outset, I don’t think there can be any absolutely indisputable proof of God’s existence or His authorship of the Torah. But I personally feel that the above argument at least helps make something that otherwise sounds completely outlandish – that we have a book in our hands whose author is God – a little more believable.

Making Moshe Proud?

Hi! I'm Mrs. Block and I recently started helping out in Mrs. Knoll's gemara seminar class on Fridays. I look forward to meeting more Ma'ayanot students in the coming weeks!

Regarding Talia Friedman's question-- Do you think Moshe Rabbeynu would be ashamed at how Judaism is practiced today? Every time I read the Gemara and see how laws are derived I just think that Moshe Rabbeynu could not have intended the words to be interpreted the way they are.

There is a gemara in Menachot 29b that I think addresses this question head-on and describes how Moshe himself was concerned with this very issue until Hashem comforted him. The story goes as follows--When Moshe went up to shamayim, he saw Hashem tying crowns (ketarim--the lines over the letters in a sefer torah) onto letters. Moshe asked Hashem why He was doing that and what was missing from Hashem's word that He needed to add these lines? Hashem responded that there will be a person many generations later who would derive halachot from every line of every letter in the Torah. Moshe asked Hashem who and Hashem answered that his name is Akiva ben Yosef, referring to Rebbi Akiva. Hashem then sent Moshe to Rebbi Akiva's beit midrash to see what was going on there. When Moshe got there, he didn't understand a word they were saying and didn't recognize anything they were talking about. The gemara describes that Moshe was extremely depressed by this, until he heard one of the students ask Rebbi Akiva where he got a certain halacha from and Rebbi Akiva answered that it is a "halacha l'moshe m'sinai." After that, the gemara describes that Moshe was appeased and placated.

I think the point of this gemara is to show that Torah was meant to be alive and dynamic and meant to be interpreted (obviously, according to Hashem's rules of interpretation that He gave to us in torah she'baal peh) and analyzed and learned in every generation. All the interpretations and derivations of halachot are really all part of a mesorah (tradition) that started with Hashem giving the Torah to Moshe on Har Sinai.

If Rebbi Akiva were alive today, he probably wouldn't recognize many of the things that go on in our world--but that is just part of the beauty of Torah. We're all living the same Torah and applying it to the circumstances of our lives.

Those who forget history are זוכה to review it

See here regarding Michelle's question & Mrs. Shapiro's answer.

Details

Why is it important for us to know what cloth were hanging in the palace and all the other seemingly extra information at the beginning of the megilla?

This is a great question.  Everyone who does any public speaking knows that you need to have a big start (a "hook") and a big finish in order to get the audience interested, and leave them remembering that they enjoyed the speech.  I'm always struck by how the Megilah seems to take the opposite approach - heavy on detail early on, a rich and exciting plot that goes by quickly in the middle, and then after the story is seemingly over, more detail on the holiday, the battles, the messages, the taxes etc.  Did you ever notice how long it is from when Haman is killed to the end?

Specifically to your question though, on a midrashic level we know that the account is meant to allude to the keilim of the בית המקדש, either because Achashverosh stole the keilim, or imitated them, or because the first פרק (and perhaps the whole megilla, but that's for another day / year) is ALSO an allegory for the King (Hashem) throwing a party and inviting the queen (Bnei Yisrael, to come rebuild the בית המקדש), who refused to come, angering the King (Hashem) who decreed that she (we) should be removed.  It is noteworthy again, that we find no record of the decree for death being carried out, only publicized - this is the decree of Haman, setting up the rest of the sefer.

A Peshat Answer

To address another of Michelle's questions:
Didn't Achashverosh tell Esther, right before her request to hang Haman's sons, that Haman's sons were hung?

This question once bothered me also, and as a budding Tanakh teacher who didn't have a blog to write to, I thought of the following. (The mefarshim on the megillah that I saw don't really address it explicitly.) If you read the peshat carefully, though, you see that at the beginning of perek 9 it says that the 10 sons of Haman were killed in the battle in Shushan, and then Esther asked that they be hanged. The hanging was not a means of killing them, since they were already dead. Rather, this display was probably meant to instill fear in any potential enemies of the Jews. See Devarim 21:22-23 and the mefarshim there for a mention of the practice of hanging a dead body and the limits thereof.

knowthewords

At a post-seuda mesiba that I attended last night surrounding Maariv, an anonymous MTA senior impressed me with his repertoire of old school, traditional Jewish music.  When I asked him how he knew all of the good stuff, he told me about this blog.  That session, lead by a top-notch baal tefilla, and later joined on the piano by a professional musician who told stories of times when he used to play concerts behind R' Shlomo Carlebach reminded me of the power of music to stir us spiritually.  I wouldn't say it's a kiyum of Talmud Torah (like this blog usually is), but I think that any time spent on that site is well-spent.

Productively Unproductive

One question Michelle Zivari asks is: How is it that Haman's wife knew something Esther didn't know? Haman's wife knew that if Haman was putting himself against the Jews the Jews would prevail why didn't Esther have the same faith instead of hesitating before going to the king?

There are many questions we can ask about Esther's actions in the Megilla, perhaps the most significant one being her ambivalence and lack of forthrightness when pleading her case before Achashveirosh. Why doesn't she just tell him what she wants, especially after he offers her half his kingdom, instead of just inviting him and Haman to not one, but two parties?! I don’t think we should assume that she doubted in Hashem or thought for a minute that ultimately the Jews would not be saved, rather, she was dealing with an impetuous and wary man, who if you read the Megilla seems to act more on impulse than anything else. Sometimes the fact that we already know the outcome of the Megilla causes us to lose sight of the fact that Esther's hishtadlut and the approach she and Mordechai chose to take in dealing with their situation was by working through political and diplomatic channels; unfortunately, this meant that they needed to have a lot of "faith" that Achashveirosh would remain levelheaded enough to act in the Jews' interest.

Someone was paying attention during the Megilla

A bunch of questions on the Purim story from Michelle Zivari:

1. Why is it important for us to know what cloth were hanging in the palace and all the other seemingly extra information at the beginning of the megilla?

2.How is it that Haman's wife knew something Esther didn't know? Haman's wife knew that if Haman was putting himself against the Jews the Jews would prevail  why didn't Esther have the same faith instead of hesitating before going to the king?

3. When Haman was coming home after he was invited to the party he told his wife that he saw Mordechai HAYEHUDI, he told her the he was Jewish why know does she say build him a gallow instead of telling him like she does later that he can't win?

4. Why after Achashverosh kills somebody does it have to say afterwards and then his anger subsided?

5. Didn't Achashverosh  tell Esther, right before her request to hang Haman's sons, that Haman's sons were hung?

6.Why are sons punished and why are they highlighted specifically?

~HAPPY PURIM

All answers, or other questions, are welcome from students & faculty alike are very welcome.  I have some thoughts, and hope to share them soon.